Xi Jinping’s Obsessions

He is the most powerful man in the world – according to the Forbes ranking, which he dominates year after year – but he remains an enigma. Who is this “red prince”, son of a former minister, who for ten years has ruled the world’s leading commercial power with an iron fist? What does he plan for China, this country-continent that he will govern for five more years – a record longevity since Mao – if he is reappointed this fall at the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)?

On site, the subject is taboo. “Xi dada” – “uncle Xi”, his nickname in the official media – is the subject of a carefully staged and closely monitored cult. Gadgets bearing his effigy, poems glorifying him, essays sold in millions of copies and a gagged opposition… “I have been ordered not to discuss, with the foreign media, any subject related to Xi or the next Party congress,” apologized a political scientist based in the Guangdong region. Four months before the great symposium of the PCC, a high and very formal moment in Chinese political life which will bring together nearly 2,300 Party delegates in Beijing, any comment is thus prohibited.

Legitimacy questioned

Behind the scenes, however, the omnipotent Chinese president must deal with other caciques. “The political balances are fragile. In reality, nothing is gained for Xi Jinping, analyzes the Canadian Alex Payette, who heads the strategic and geopolitical intelligence consulting company Cercius. His leadership is not unanimous. He must find support within many currents. And the period is not the easiest.” Between the Ukrainian crisis, in the face of which Beijing remains in retreat, and the zero-Covid strategy which freezes many megacities of the country and paralyzes whole sections of the national economy, the warning signals are multiplying. To the point that some economists do not rule out a risk of recession in the coming months. This would be a first since the Maoist era! “The personal legitimacy of Xi Jinping is directly called into question”, assures the expert.

Read alsoHow Xi Jinping wants to control the youth

In response, factions within the CCP itself are concerned about its management, deemed intransigent, of the health crisis. In particular in Shanghai – which generates 4% of the national GDP – where strict confinement was imposed for ten weeks on its 25 million inhabitants following an outbreak of Covid-19 cases. “The local political and economic forces nevertheless fought until the last day to refuse the complete confinement of the megalopolis”, notes Alex Payette. In vain. Xi Jinping remained adamant. And dispatched, at the beginning of April, nearly 40,000 additional health personnel and several thousand soldiers. The stakes are crucial and many guess, behind this battle against the coronavirus, a fierce political struggle in which the strong man of the regime plays big. Especially since other cities – including Beijing – are also threatened with confinement. A situation that worries, on the spot, a population tired of so many restrictions. “More and more ordinary citizens are criticizing the zero-Covid strategy, considers a French entrepreneur, from Shanghai.

Opponents silenced

Weaken it… To the point of being dismissed? A very unlikely eventuality as the strong man of Zhongnanhai (the Chinese Elysée) padlocks all the key organs of the CCP; this party-state which forms the sole and stainless pillar of the regime. Nothing is done or decided without the consent of the permanent committee of his political bureau, the highest circle of power chaired by… Xi Jinping. As for the entrepreneurial elites, none dare to question this Party dictatorship. The private sector – long supported by the regime – is placed under close surveillance. At the personal request of Xi Jinping, all listed groups are now required to open a section of the CCP. A practice that is spreading to all companies based in China, whether local or foreign. “It’s a complicated situation but against which it is futile to oppose”, recognizes the same French leader.

Because in Xi Jinping’s China, the dissenters are quickly silenced. We no longer count the number of big bosses, critical of the regime, severely reframed or simply dismissed. Like Ren Zhiqiang, real estate tycoon and son of a minister, who was recently sentenced to eighteen years in prison. And this for having dared to call Xi Jinping a “clown” in March 2020 and openly criticized his management of the Covid-19 crisis. Ditto for the “serial entrepreneur” Li Huaiqing, originally from Chongqing, heavily sentenced at the end of 2020 for “subversion”. Not to mention the emblematic Jack Ma, founder of the giant Alibaba, placed in the crosshairs of power for having questioned the Chinese banking regulatory system two years ago. Yesterday a symbol of flamboyant capitalism, the man has now disappeared from the radar.

Well-maintained nationalism

Beyond that, Xi Jinping also knows, to strengthen his power, “to speak to the people”, assures Liu Kaiming, founder in Shenzhen of the Institute of Contemporary Observation, an independent NGO. For this, the strong man of the regime does not hesitate to stir up an already burning nationalism. On the question of Taiwan, for example, the ultras of the regime have long advocated the hard option – military – to “recover” the island, which Xi considers to be the 23rd province of China. An option that “many people in China support, especially since the invasion of Ukraine by Russia”, explains Liu Kaiming. Could the current international context then decide Xi to take action? “What he has in mind does not exclude the use of force, recalls the sinologist Jean-Pierre Cabestan, author of China’s International Policy (Presses de Sciences-Po, reissue in 2022). But the war of Putin, condemned by all Western countries, does not encourage him for the moment to favor military action on Taiwan, which would have very serious political and economic consequences.

For Xi, the urgency is ultimately elsewhere. While the social situation is deteriorating – with a high risk of increasing poverty (after decades of decline) – the man must give pledges to the left wing of the Party. And reconnect at all costs with sustainable growth, the regime’s real fuel. But with the Covid-19, nothing is going as planned. Will he be able to restore this momentum between now and the next Party congress, while the economy is at half mast? Nothing is less sure.

Power struggles at the top of the Chinese regime

Trying to decipher the political map of the PCC – and its games of alliances – is a risky bet, as the currents which cross and shake this single party are both innumerable and particularly moving.

“The CCP is undermined by intense power struggles, confirms Alex Payette, a fine connoisseur of the mysteries of the Chinese regime. There are however figures within it who stand out.” Caciques who, dubbed by Xi Jinping, could take the lead at the 20th Party Congress this fall. This is the case of He Lifang (67), a former collaborator of Xi when the latter ruled Fujian province. Ditto for the “young” Chen Min’er (61), who is a potential dolphin.

Chen Min’er in October 2017. Secretary of the Chongqing CPC, he is seen as Xi’s heir apparent. (EPA/Wu Hong/MaxPPP)

At the head of the CCP in the megalopolis of Chongqing, Chen should enter the permanent committee of the political bureau, the highest circle of Chinese power.

Li Qiang (62), current strongman of Shanghai, could also be rewarded for his loyalty and be offered the post of Prime Minister. Unless Xi Jinping prefers Zhao Leji (65), head of the very influential committee for disciplinary inspection, the Party’s anti-corruption body.

By Pierre Tiessen